Alison Evans, deputy head of Asia Pacific Country Risk, IHS Markit
If the summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un were to go ahead, it would be the first time a sitting US president meets an incumbent North Korean leader. One of North Korea’s foreign policy aims since the 1990s has been a win like this – when Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang in 1994 and Bill Clinton in 2009 they were both former US presidents.
Both North Korea’s government and the Trump administration are likely to paint any meetings as diplomatic and political wins; North Korea’s state media reporting continues to emphasise that the inter-Korean rapprochement and this invitation to Trump were Kim’s initiative, as he continues to seek stability and security on the Korean peninsula.
Despite its recent flurry of diplomacy, it is highly unlikely that North Korea’s strategic interests or policy priorities have changed. The official South Korean statement said that North Korea agreed “it would have no reason to possess nuclear weapons if military threats against North Korea were resolved and the security of its system were guaranteed”.
Even if North Korea does not carry out any more missile launches or nuclear tests as promised while talks are ongoing, it could still continue to develop its capabilities, such as by producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. In addition, security guarantees requested by North Korea will probably be onerous for the United States; for example, security assurances provided to North Korea by Clinton were insufficient for implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
