Alison Evans, Deputy Head of Asia Pacific Country Risk, IHS Markit
On 27 April South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un met in the southern half of the De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) which divides the two Koreas. Similar to previous summits in 2000 and 2007, discussions centred around improving inter-Korean relations and their mutual desire for peace and a “complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula”.
Although the holding of high-level summits is a positive indicator for war risks, they are largely symbolic and do not necessarily point to a shift in the underlying motivations and strategic interests of the countries involved.
Significance:
The positive outcome of the Kim-Moon summit – specifically joint statement that both Koreas seek peace on the peninsula – means that the planned summit between Kim and US President Donald Trump is more than likely to go ahead. Any high-profile talks between North Korea and the US would be a coup for the North Korean government and Kim, who remains relatively popular in part thanks to strong economic growth since he came to power.
Like the Kim-Moon joint statement calling for denuclearization of peninsula, it is probable that North Korea will agree to some language referring to nuclear weapons in a statement after the Kim-Moon or planned Kim-Trump summit. However, North Korea is likely to view denuclearisation as something that applies to the whole peninsula, if not the US’s entire nuclear arsenal. North Korea’s statements mention “global disarmament” and the removal of what it called the US’s “hostile policy” as a pre-condition for North Korean concessions, similar to its demands prior to inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007. For example, on 27 February, North Korea’s official newspaper Rodong Shinmun wrote “It is the United States that must abandon its nuclear ambitions before others…if the United States opts for nuclear dismantlement, the denuclearisation issue of the world will be easily settled.”
However, it is almost certain that North Korea is, and will remain, unwilling to “denuclearise” as defined by the United States and its allies. Even if North Korea does not carry out missile launches or nuclear tests as promised while talks are being organised or held, it could still develop its capabilities, such as by producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. Similarly, even if North Korea allows IAEA inspectors entry to certain nuclear sites, it is unlikely to publicly identify or permit access to all sites. In addition, South Korean officials said that North Korea agreed that “it would have no reason to possess nuclear weapons if military threats against North Korea were resolved and the security of its system were guaranteed”. However, such security guarantees are probably still vaguely defined and will almost certainly be onerous, or impossible, for the US. Notably, North Korea perceiving security assurances from Clinton as insufficient was one of the reasons that the 1994 Agreed Framework for co-operation collapsed in December 2002.
