The missile:
North Korea successfully test-fired on 4 July what it claimed was its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
US Pacific Command said in a statement that it assessed the projectile as being an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). However, Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) claimed that the missile fired was an ICBM called the Hwasong-14 that reached an altitude of 2,802 km and flew 933 km before hitting a target in the Sea of Japan, making this the longest-range ballistic missile tested by Pyongyang to date.
The North Korean data on the weapon’s trajectory is similar to that provided by Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD), which stated that the missile reached an altitude exceeding 2,500 km, and flew approximately 900 km.
The KCNA also released images showing the missile being carried by a 16-wheeled (8-axle) transport-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle that is thought to be based on the Chinese Wanshan Special Vehicle WS51200. This TEL has previously been seen carrying various ballistic missiles and a missile launch container. The TEL is shown transporting the Hwasong-14 to an undisclosed location, erecting it on a platform, and moving away before the launch.
Despite UN sanctions barring North Korea from conducting any test of nuclear or ballistic missile technology, Pyongyang has engaged in a series of demonstrations of military might in recent years that have alarmed its Asian neighbours and the international community.
Less than two months ago, on 14 May, North Korea test-fired what state media described as “a new ground-to-ground medium- [to]long-range strategic ballistic rocket called the Hwasong-12 capable of carrying a large-size heavy nuclear warhead”. The missile reached an altitude of over 2,000 km before falling into the Sea of Japan.
North Korea has been trying to develop a nuclear-tipped ICBM for years, with Kim announcing in his 2017 New Year’s Day address that his country had entered “the final stage of preparation for the test launch of an [ICBM]”.
On 23 May the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Marine Corps Lieutenant General Vincent R Stewart, had warned that if North Korea was left on its current trajectory, it would succeed in obtaining an ICBM capable of posing a direct threat to the US mainland.
The DIA director’s statements came a week before the US homeland missile defence system, known as Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), succeeded in its first-ever attempt to intercept a simulated ICBM target.
The GMD system is specifically designed to shoot down missiles in the event of a limited North Korean attack against the US homeland. The test was a long-planned event, but GMD is directly linked to Pyongyang’s missile programme.
Significance:
North Korea’s latest test-launch marks a significant step in the country’s evolving missile capabilities. A ballistic missile is considered an ICBM when its range is greater than 5,500 km, according to the US intelligence community.
Assuming that the reported trajectory data is correct, the Hwasong-14 should be able to achieve a nominal range of around 5,700 km. Engine cut-off velocity and hence re-entry speed into the atmosphere should be around 6 km/s.
The missile could even travel more than 6,000 km if launched in an easterly direction given to the Earth’s rotation. This would technically enable North Korea to target all of Alaska and a small part of northwestern Canada. However, it would not be enough to reach the contiguous United States or Hawaii.
The missile fired on 4 July shows parallels to the Hwasong-12 that was launched in May. Both missiles have a similar conical skirt at the rear and, more importantly, a propulsion unit featuring a single main engine aided by four small Vernier engines, which are also used for steering.
From the orange-coloured smoke seen at ignition and the motor efflux it would seem that the Hwasong-14’s first-stage engine uses the high-energy storable propellant combination of NTO oxidiser and UDMH fuel. This propulsive mix is also thought to be used by the Hwasong-12.
The fact that the Hwasong-14’s first stage has only one main engine indicates the missile is probably not based on the Hwasong-13 (also known as the KN-08), which is equipped with two main engines in the first stage plus four Verniers. It is possible, however, that the missile fired on 4 July is at least partly derived from the Hwasong-12, with removal of the missile’s original re-entry vehicle (RV) and the addition of a second propulsive stage topped by a previously unseen RV.
It is important to point out that there seems to be some confusion surrounding the ‘Hwasong-14’ designation. According to the 2017 Ballistic And Cruise Missile Threat Defense publication released by the US Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee released in June 2017, this designation is attributed to a two-stage missile shown at the October 2015 military parade in Pyongyang.
However, this missile, which is also known to the US intelligence community as the KN-14, seems to be a variant of the Hwasong-13: an earlier three-stage missile that was previously shown at military parades held between 2012 and 2013.
As such the two-stage iteration of the missile has also often been referred to as the ‘Hwasong-13 type 2015’, while the original is referred to by similar sources as the Hwasong-13 type 2012-2013.
According to Jane’s analyst Karl Dewey, the successful development of an ICBM by North Korea, would give decision-makers in Washington reason to pause for thought before deciding to strike the communist regime.
Although North Korea is unable to match the US in terms of numbers, similar ‘minimum deterrence’ postures have been held by other nuclear powers including China, France and the UK, with deterrence premised on being able to inflict unacceptable losses, rather than total destruction.
This new tier complements North Korea’s well-developed escalatory posture towards its neighbours. The communist country is already able to field conventional, chemical and, possibly, nuclear weapons against Seoul and Tokyo. As a result, a danger of increased North Korean military confidence is that it raises the risk of increased belligerence.
Although small numbers of nuclear weapons may incentivise a first strike by the US, Pyongyang’s ability to threaten Seoul has previously dissuaded strikes against the North. Assuming the Trump administration faces the same reluctance from its allies, the US is likely to push for increased sanctions and displays of US commitment to the region.
Authors: Gabriel Dominguez, Neil Gibson
Additional reporting: Markus Schiller and Karl Dewey
