By Scott M. Bernat
The Asia-Pacific Region sea lanes and ports – key and vital to commercial shipping, trade and military engagement – present a significant challenge to security professionals. The diverse capabilities and limitations of individual country intelligence and security forces to identify and mitigate potential threats require a pro-active, cost-effective teamwork approach to ensure operational and supply chain integrity, as well as the safety and security of persons and assets.
Many husbanding agents and other maritime/port professionals have recognized the need for this synergy, often including security-related materials and services in their support packages. Security programs and requirements such as those established in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code remain key and essential to the safeguarding of Asia’s ports and maritime assets. The challenge remains as to how best to implement and maintain adequate security in the often fast-paced, operational and production-driven port and shipping community.
REGIONAL CONCERNS
Acts of piracy, the threat of terrorism and common criminal activity continue to highlight the necessity for security as an integral part of a ship and port’s everyday operations. While most piracy in the Asia-Pacific region today has reportedly focused on non-violent theft from ships at anchor, there continue to be incidents involving violence against the crew and kidnapping for ransom.
For centuries pirates in the region have plied their trade, taking advantage of the abundance of commercial shipping that transits critical trade routes such as the Straits of Malacca. The February 2004 explosion aboard the commercial passenger ship MV SuperFerry 14 in the Philippines reminded everyone that the threat of terrorism in the region remains real. Although the September 2008 pirate hijacking of the MV Faina, with its cargo of military equipment and munitions, occurred outside of this region (Somalia), the event punctuates vulnerabilities and raises concerns about the potential consequences should we fail to adequately protect our assets. Compounding these issues and contributing to the overall lack of confidence in security is corruption, both within the government and private sectors.
PORT SECURITY
Port security in the Asia-Pacific Region ranges from non-existent to high tech, dependent on the individual country. The entrances to some port facilities are either open to all traffic or minimally guarded, with individual terminal operators bearing full responsibility for their own security. Some commercial ports have non-existent or limited daily security boat activity, and even when the boats are present, lack of adequate training and experience for the crew diminishes their capabilities to detect, deter and defend against a potential threat.
Guard force in the ports usually includes private security companies and local law enforcement personnel who in many locations, are not properly vetted for criminal or subversive backgrounds; lack proper training; are sparsely equipped; and infrequently train together in scenario-based events. Corruption, or what is more commonly known as “the culture of tipping,” compounds these problems, not only increasing the cost of doing business with or utilizing the facilities of some ports, but also compromising the integrity of even the best security plan.
SHIP SECURITY
The primary responsibility for shipboard security lies with the ship’s captain or master and crew. Problems arise when crewmembers are compromised and participate in theft or allow breaches of security, as suspected in at least some of the reported pirate-led incidents in the region. Ships at anchor within sight of shore, without adequate security measures in place, present easy targets for thieves.
Once pier side, a commercial ship often depends on the existing port security infrastructure to adequately secure its outer perimeter. Visiting warships add additional layers of security beyond that which is provided by the port; however, those security measures are more often than not diminished due to host country prohibitions on the deployment of armed foreign military personnel on sovereign territory. In addition visiting cruise, commercial and military ships rarely, if ever, directly participate in joint ship/shore security exercises within the visited ports due to the harried pace and operational requirements of shipping, port and mission schedules. The combination of any or all of the above presents a significant security challenge to even the most experienced maritime and port professional.
SHIP HUSBANDING AND SECURITY
Increasingly common is the utilization of maritime husbanding agents to provide for and/or coordinate with the port and local government for the materials and guard force personnel necessary to set up perimeter security in and around the maritime asset and associated port area.
These agents usually employ local personnel, either directly or as sub-contractors, who are knowledgeable of the area and have many developed contacts, to include local citizens, government and business entities. These local personnel sell the idea that their established contacts will ensure that an appropriate level of security will be achieved and maintained. Furthermore, these local employees may not have security backgrounds commensurate with the task at hand.
Of particular concern is the fact that in many countries, proper law enforcement/security vetting for the detection of criminal or subversive backgrounds is either not done or required. Even if the checks are completed, there is no guarantee that a derogatory background check will be surfaced, given the lack of proper documentation and data basing of this type of record. Compounding this issue are low salaries and the corresponding temptation of obtaining payment through corrupt practices.
Again, the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of maritime and port assets does not lie with the contractors, but rests with the ship and port operators.
THE NCIS MODEL
The US Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), with worldwide responsibilities to protect the people, family and assets of the US Navy and US Marine Corps, routinely interacts with US and foreign government agencies, port operators and husbanding agents to develop seamless port security programs in locations frequented by US Department of the Navy personnel. NCIS special agents and physical security specialists develop critical security relationships in each port; conduct host nation-coordinated physical security surveys of these locations; and work closely with the local police and military security forces, husbanding agents and port operators to implement enhanced security measures in support of visiting maritime assets.
During the course of a ship visit, NCIS personnel continually monitor the local threat environment through teamwork and close coordination with the local government and security services, effectively mitigating potential criminal or terrorist threats. In addition, the NCIS Security Training, Assistance and Assessment Team (STAAT) conducts training and seminars in port security and related disciplines, significantly impacting and enhancing the security capabilities in the ports. The effective integration and teamwork of all available NCIS, host government and commercial port operator security assets remain the foundation of this program.
THE WAY AHEAD
Protecting maritime assets and port facilities need not be a lesson in futility. The tools and capabilities are available to even the most budget-strapped organization. Understanding the threat as well as knowing what resources are available and how best to utilize them will ensure a cost-effective and viable security posture.
By following these basic principles and procedures ship and port operators can be well on their way to establishing a confident and successful security program:
• Understand The Threat – Design the program so that it relates to the known level of criminal, terrorist or subversive activity in the area. Does it affect personnel or assets and if so, how? Are the threats to the maritime asset or port facility criminal or terrorist-related? This common sense approach will ensure money is spent in functional areas directly related to the correct type and level of threat. There is no need to invest in or rent expensive waterside stand-off barriers if the primary threat in your location is from landside criminals.
• Teamwork – Work together with local law enforcement and security services. Without their knowledge and expertise of the local environment, it would be difficult to ascertain the extent of the threat.
• Employee Welfare – Sensitize the crew and employees to the current threat situation and relate this to how negative situations affect the overall organization and, subsequently, their personal interests. Invest in employees’ futures through various training programs designed to enhance their functional skills and job performance. Set job performance standards and expectations and link work performance to salary increases and bonuses. Ensure adequate family medical plans are in place. Bottom line is that if the employer takes care of its employees, they will respond in kind.
• Outside Agency Assistance – Many official agencies — especially when the maritime asset or port facility has direct connections to a specific country’s trade interests — offer free security advice, assistance and training. The US Coast Guard, for example, maintains an International Port Security Program focused on assisting port facilities that are in line with US Trade interests. The basic standard utilized is the ISPS code. Another example is the US Department of Homeland Security Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). This is a joint government-business initiative designed to build cooperative relationships focused on the maritime supply chain and border security.
• Private Security Company Assistance – Dependent upon the ship or port operator’s budget, private businesses can assist in developing a security program that not only keeps personnel and assets safe and secure but also meets ISPS standards.
• Due Diligence – Critical to any successful program are the background checks accomplished on all security providers and contractors. Reputation and integrity are very important, ultimately impacting operations as well as business development.
CONCLUSION
Maritime and port security in the Asia-Pacific Region varies from location to location. A true understanding of the threat environment, knowledge of the resources available to mitigate the threat and how best to utilize them, as well as teamwork (both from within and outside your organization) will ensure the effectiveness of any security program.
About the Author
Scott M. Bernat is the US Naval Criminal Investigative Service Special Agent in Charge of the US Embassy Jakarta, Indonesia Force Protection Detachment. His previous assignments included Chief of US Naval Security, US Embassy Thailand and Assistant Force Protection Officer/Security Advisor to the Commander, US Seventh Fleet (Asia-Pacific Region). See http://id.linkedin.com/in/scottbernat.
